President Bush and his determination to win at any cost
As President Bush readies to send another 20,000 troops over to Iraq - despite a very revealing report from the Iraq Study Group about a month ago - Robert Scheer has written this rather insightful piece.
In the meantime what I'd like to know is the same thing on the minds of many others in this country: We were quick to impeach President Clinton for his sexual indiscretions in the Oval Office, but why are we not moving to impeach this president, who millions of Americans believe has lied his way into and through the entire Iraqi War? At least with Clinton's dirty business no lives were lost.
About those who support sending more troops to Iraq, there's an expression that goes something like this: "They will fight to the last drop of everyone else's blood." That certainly seems to be the case with President George W. Bush.
In the meantime what I'd like to know is the same thing on the minds of many others in this country: We were quick to impeach President Clinton for his sexual indiscretions in the Oval Office, but why are we not moving to impeach this president, who millions of Americans believe has lied his way into and through the entire Iraqi War? At least with Clinton's dirty business no lives were lost.
About those who support sending more troops to Iraq, there's an expression that goes something like this: "They will fight to the last drop of everyone else's blood." That certainly seems to be the case with President George W. Bush.
posted by Cheryl Hentz at 12:42 PM
1 Comments:
"We were quick to impeach President Clinton for his sexual indiscretions in the Oval Office, but why are we not moving to impeach this president, who millions of Americans believe has lied his way into and through the entire Iraqi War?"
Millions more then that believe he was telling the truth. Why would Sandy Burgler have to go into the archives and steal the evidence? Your past shows you can't handle the truth, but I'm happy to give JUST A LITTLE PIECE OF IT!!!
The media effort to undermine the rationale for the war in Iraq has taken an interesting twist. Faced with the release of government documents indicating a substantial connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Newsweek has tried its best to dismiss or distort the evidence.
The controversy involves an article in Newsweek magazine's Periscope, called "A Special White House Slide Show," revisiting the issue of a meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia in April of 2001 allegedly involving Muhammad Atta, the leader of the 9/11 terrorists who crashed planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The meeting allegedly was with an Iraqi intelligence officer, Ahmed al-Ani, and if true, could provide a strong link between Saddam Hussein's Iraq government and al-Qaeda, and even indicate possible involvement by Saddam in the horrific terrorist act of 9/11.
Newsweek said that in 2002, the Pentagon had produced three sets of slides—one version for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, one for CIA director George Tenet, and one for the White House, each as part of a report showing alleged ties between Iraq and al Qaeda.
In the White House presentation, according to Newsweek's sources, there was a slide that wasn't part of the others, suggesting that the Atta meeting had, in fact, taken place. It gave specific details of the alleged visit, including one reference that al-Ani ordered an Iraqi intelligence officer to "issue funds to Atta."
But Newsweek couldn't accept this and dismissed the explosive information. Its sources were four "former senior intel officials who monitored investigations into Atta's alleged Iraqi contacts…" and who were anonymous. They were said to have "rejected" the "anecdote" about the payoff, though it doesn't say why they rejected it.
Who are these officials? Are these the officials who falsely told Newsweek that the Koran had been flushed down a toilet at Guantanamo Bay? If so, Newsweek needs some new sources.
There was another document to which Newsweek linked, titled "High-Level Contacts, 1990-2002." It listed meetings between bin Laden and Faruq Hijazi, the Deputy Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
Through the Freedom of Information Act, Newsweek obtained these documents. They demonstrate that top U.S. officials not only had evidence of links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, but evidence of a link between Iraqi intelligence and the top 9/11 terrorist.
But Newsweek didn't want to believe what was in these documents. So it found some anonymous officials who didn't trust the information and tried to cast doubt on them. They supressed the parts that told the other side of the story. Just as you here in your blog do.
The links between Saddam and al Qaeda did exist.
And they existed before the Bush Administration, most notably in the 1998 indictment of Osama bin Laden by the Clinton administration.
But people like you are so anti-Bush and anti-Iraq War they cannot accept any such evidence, even when they obtain smoking gun documents under the Freedom of Information Act. You suppress it. Cover it up and never report it.
Why? Because it runs against WHAT YOU SAY IS FACT. Well, just because it comes out of YOUR MOUTH, does not make it so.
Need more. I got it!
Was Saddam Hussein a security threat to the United States? Did the Iraqi dictator have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist ties? What happened to the weapons of mass destruction everyone believed were in his possession? Did Saddam move them? Did they ever exist?
All of those questions have been dogging President George W. Bush and his administration since the start of the Iraq war. Politicians and respected U.S. military and intelligence officials have weighed in publicly on both sides of the debate, but until recently the general public has had little of the information necessary to make a fully informed decision on its own.
But that is changing.
The U.S. government seized thousands of classified Iraqi government papers when Saddam's regime was toppled, and Washington recently released a trove of these documents on the Pentagon's Foreign Military Studies Office Web site.
The documents, many in Arabic and with no accompanying translation, provide multiple insights into events inside pre-war Iraq. The dossier, however, is huge and disorganized. Digging out its secrets is a laborious task — one that the U.S. government decided to leave to others.
One of those who has taken up the challenge is Ray Robison, currently a military operations research analyst specializing in aviation and missile research in Huntsville, Ala. Robison served on active duty as a fire support officer for the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Wash. and as a Battalion Signal Officer with the 101st Airborne. His 10 years of active service include duty in the Gulf War and on peacekeeping assignment in Kosovo.
Robison also served in Qatar as a contractor for the Defense Intelligence Agency, working as part of the CIA-directed Iraq Survey Group (ISG) that examined efforts by Saddam Hussein to build and hide weapons of mass destruction, among other objectives. (The ISG's conclusion: Saddam had substantial WMD capability, but destroyed or otherwise disposed of much of it, though he retained the capability of restoring much of it should sanctions against him be lifted.)
Robison supervised a group of linguists to analyze, archive and exploit documents and materials of Saddam's regime. He has seen thousands of these documents and translations previously, having worked with them for a year in Iraq. He was involved with briefing his group's findings to senior U.S. military and political leaders. Robison was awarded for his efforts by the Iraq Survey Group as a media shift supervisor.
With a small cadre of independent translators to support his efforts, Robison will now translate and analyze scores of the unexplored trove of documents from Saddam's regime in a FOXNews.com exclusive series: The Saddam Dossier.
In addition to translation, Robison will provide analysis based upon his work for the Iraq Survey Group and his military operations research experience. On occasion, he or a translator will remark in the translation itself for clarity, but will maintain the integrity of the document. All of their work will be linked online to the original Arabic texts, stored on the Foreign Military Studies Office Web site. Robison's analysis, however, is based on his own opinions.
"It is my belief," Robison says, "that those who just want to know the truth will find new and shocking information in these documents and may even change their beliefs about the reasons for the war."
"However, these documents may not answer every valid question, and conclusions may change based on new documentation."
Iraq, supplied how-to manuals for Arab operatives working throughout Afghanistan before 9/11, and provided military assistance to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
That's the most likely conclusion drawn from an apparent training manual unearthed in captured Iraqi government computer files translated and analyzed exclusively for Fox News, and made public for the first time.
The document, apparently written before the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, could bolster the Bush administration's contention that Saddam Hussein was providing support for Islamic extremists who were plotting against America.
The training manual warns, in stark how-to terms, of the dangers of "information leaks," and instructs Arab operatives inside Afghanistan to dress like Afghan tribesmen, to avoid being followed ("Routine is the enemy of security"), to always be armed, and "to behave as if enemies would strike at any moment."
The manual also cautions Arabs to "beware of rapid and spontaneous friendships with Afghans who speak Arabic," and "always make sure about the identity of your neighbors and classify them as regular people, opponents or allies."
That revelation is provided exclusively to Fox News by Ray Robison, a former member of the CIA-directed Iraq Survey Group. ISG supervised a group of linguists to analyze, archive and exploit the hundreds of captured documents and materials of Saddam's regime.
Click here for more on Ray Robison and the Saddam Dossier
Fox News and Robison last week revealed the contents of a 1999 notebook kept by an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) operative. That notebook detailed how Saddam's agents aggressively pursued and entered into a diplomatic, intelligence, and security arrangement with the Taliban and Islamist extremists operating in Afghanistan — years before the 9/11 attacks.
While the training manual revealed today by Fox News does not mention the IIS agent's notebook, the manual does suggest an Arab regime, most likely Saddam, may have provided the military help requested by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The manual, declassified and recently released by the Foreign Military Studies Office, advises its Arab readers never to show your "military ID." That strongly suggests that Iraq was sending professional military assistance to Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks
Translation:
Editor's notes:
The translation is provided by Robison's associate, known here as "Sammi," who puts translation clarifications in parenthesis. Robison uses (RR) for clarification and bold-face type for emphasis.
Translator's notes:
This seven-page document contains instructions for a group of Arab men, military ID holders, and their families. These men appear to be joining other military men already in Afghanistan who are running "hosting places." These facilities appear to be safe houses or training facilities for other Arabs. The work involves receiving Arab men who may or may not choose to stay at the facility.
Even though pre-9/11 Afghanistan was teeming with Arab Mujihadeen who were proud to represent their native countries, the instructions advise the "brothers" to keep a low profile and behave as if enemies would strike at any moment.
Begin Translation for 2RAD-2004-600760-ELC.PDF
In the Name of God the Merciful
Personnel Security:
Respected brother,
Know that one of the main causes of information leaks is from personnel (translator's note: personnel talking), this is why we try to cooperate with you so that neither you or one of your brothers becomes the cause of a catastrophe that might hit one of the brothers or all of them.
Please follow these instructions:
1- Know as much as you need. (translator's note: don't ask too many questions)
2- Don't talk too much; it is said that "silence is wisdom."
3- It is recommended that all personnel wear Afghan clothing so they do not stand out from other people.
4- All the brothers should go to the market by themselves, alone.
5- It is not advised to move alone at night. (At night, walk the streets on foot)
6- As much as possible do not disclose your identity as an Arab.
7- Avoid excitement whether by glorifying or bashing.
8- Avoid being observed (translator's note: being followed and observed) and always notice who is walking behind you or following you from a distance; review the observation manual.
9- All brothers should be always armed even if with a small knife in their pockets.
10- Check your pockets and never leave important papers in them when moving around.
11- Always be careful in personal relations with Afghans or Pakistanis.
12- Avoid giving any information about the locations of your brothers.
13- It is forbidden to discuss work issues with the women.
14- It is forbidden to take children to parks and offices.
15- It is forbidden to talk about your work or the nature of your mission with anybody who is not related to it.
16- Beware of habit in your daily routine because the rule says, "Routine is the enemy of security."
17- If you are moving and have a large amount of money, beware of showing it in the market so you do not attract robbers.
18- Always beware when you are talking about the work because somebody not related to your work, the women or the children, might hear you.
19- Beware of rapid and spontaneous friendships with Afghans who speak Arabic.
20- In public places beware of talking about work issues because some Afghans know Arabic but you cannot notice this.
21- Always be forgiving when you are buying from, selling to or dealing with Afghans and avoid trouble.
22- Children are not allowed to go out by themselves whether to buy stuff or play.
23- Always make sure about the identity of your neighbors and classify them as regular people, opponents or allies.
Security of compounds:
The security of the house or the living quarters is one of the most important aspects of security because the house contains the personnel, the equipment and the important documents. Make the house secure, securing from all those aspects, and it is advisable that these measures be taken seriously. There are important precautions, to the security of the house, that have to be taken before renting but it is not practical to list them here.
(Translator's notes: several instructions for securing the houses are listed, including location, neighborhood, weapons inside, rules for children, night-time policy, and patrolling the surroundings)
Security of the hosting places:
A hosting place is the place where most infiltration takes place. What we mean by hosting place is a public place where people, who most of the time are not related to the work, are received. But in case we are receiving special guests or others, it is not considered a hosting place but it is affiliated to the security of the special offices. (Translator's notes: there are 23 instructions for the security of the hosting places; here are 10)
At the hosting place a room for the security unit is necessary for observation:
1. The hosting place should be away from the living space of the brothers and their meeting areas.
2. Brothers should not go often to the hosting place except for a purpose.
3. It is forbidden to practice any private or secret matter in the hosting place.
4. The hosting place where our brothers are grouped, like Kandahar
a. Anybody who enters it should be known
b. Nobody lives in it unless a known party recommends him
c. Persons living in the hosting place should be organized and authorized by the brother in charge of the hosting place. It should be known where the brother is going and when he is coming back.
5. Brothers living in Kandahar and who repetitively visit the hosting place should abide by the Holy Hadith (a sacred text of Islam), "The virtue of one's Islam is to leave what does not belong to him," and not to start a relation with the brothers living in the hosting place.
6. The brother in charge of the hosting place should assign a private place for each brother living in the hosting place and not leave the decision to the visitor.
7. There should be a schedule for night guard in the hosting place.
8. The communication room should be isolated in the hosting place and not close to the visitor's rooms.
9.The hosting place should have a reception room where the visiting brother is dealt with, before entering the hosting place, and decide if he is going to stay in it.
10. Public meetings are strictly forbidden in the hosting place.
Security of movement:
First: Security of cars and vehicles
Constant movement of cars between the houses of the brothers and their workplace is a big breach which might lead to discovery of those places if the brother driving was not aware of being watched. It is possible that the car itself, with its occupant, might be a target, therefore:
(Translator's notes: several instructions for driving and car security follow; here are a few)
- The brothers driving the cars should check their car daily to make sure it does not contain any foreign material or device.
- All the brothers driving the cars should be armed and should have their weapons license.
- Brothers driving the cars should always be wearing Afghan clothing so their identity cannot be easily discovered.
- Brothers driving the cars should not always follow one path and should not have a constant habit in choosing their way.
Second: security of movement and travel inside Afghanistan
Travel is one of the most important security breaches that we should be careful of because of the long absence from the brothers and facing the dangers of the road.
- It is absolutely forbidden for a person to travel by himself, and it is preferable that the number of travelers be at least three including a trusted Afghan.
- In rest areas a brother should not show his military ID.
- The security office should be informed about the travel before the travel, and when you reach your destination you should inform the office for follow up.
(Translator's notes: several instructions for mail and communications security are listed, right out of an intelligence personnel book)
Public meetings security:
The danger of public meetings is that it often groups most of the personnel present in Kandahar. If the enemy manages to know and reach the meeting place, he would have a dangerous opportunity and to make him miss this chance we should follow some precautions.
(Translator's notes: several instructions concerning public meetings security follow)
End Translation
Analysis:
This document supports a few strong conclusions. It clearly proves that an Arab country was providing professional military assistance to Arab operatives in Afghanistan. While the document does not identify the country of origin of these Arab men, it's a logical omission since it wouldn't make sense to name the country in a memo whose purpose is to instruct how to hide one's nationality.
It is important to note, however, that in 1999, Iraq — along with Syria — was again identified by the U.S. Department of State as a government sponsor of terrorism, the only two Arab nations classified as state sponsors of terrorism at that time.
The document also appears to be a professional military intelligence letter of instruction. These men have military IDs. The instruction references an intelligence manual. The letter mentions "trusted" Afghans, so we know they are working in cooperation with forces in Afghanistan. It is highly unlikely that any military would send a semi-permanent contingent with families into Afghanistan for cooperation or training unless the Afghan organization was stable and in control. It therefore seems likely that these soldiers are working closely with the Taliban.
There are media reports of a group of Iraqi soldiers in Afghanistan. Jeffery Goldberg reported for The New Yorker in a February 2003 article entitled The CIA and Pentagon take another look at Al Qaeda and Iraq:
"In interviews with senior officials, the following picture emerged: American intelligence believes that Al Qaeda and Saddam reached a non-aggression agreement in 1993, and that the relationship deepened further in the mid-nineteen-nineties, when an Al Qaeda operative — a native-born Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi — was dispatched by bin Laden to ask the Iraqis for help in poison-gas training. Al-Iraqi's mission was successful, and an unknown number of trainers from an Iraqi secret-police organization called Unit 999 were dispatched to camps in Afghanistan to instruct Al Qaeda terrorists."
Unit 999 might sound like it's straight out of a James Bond movie, but there are many references to an actual Iraqi intelligence unit that appears to take on Special Forces missions. Global Security.org, which sources most of its information from declassified U.S. government documents, describes Unit 999:
This "deep penetration" unit, responsible for domestic and international clandestine operations, was headquartered at the army base at Salman Pak, southeast of Baghdad. Unit 999 activities included infiltration of opposition militias in the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, a planned effort by the unit to kidnap the U.S. commander General Schwarzkopf from Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm, and sabotage attacks on Iranian oil installations in the 1990s.
This manual provides further evidence that the Iraqi military was active in Afghanistan and working with the Taliban. The Taliban harbored and trained with Al Qaeda. The information in the document matches media reports that U.S. intelligence sources believed the IIS was training Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It also matches information from other IIS documentation that shows requests from Islamic Jihad groups in Afghanistan for Iraqi military assistance.
Newly declassified documents captured by U.S. forces indicate that Saddam Hussein's inner circle not only actively reached out to the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan and terror-based jihadists in the region, but also hosted discussions with a known Al Qaeda operative about creating jihad training "centers," possibly in Baghdad.
Ray Robison, a former member of the CIA-directed Iraq Survey Group (ISG), supervised a group of linguists to analyze, archive and exploit the hundreds of captured documents and materials of Saddam's regime.
This is the final installment in a three-part series concerning a notebook kept by an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) agent called Khaled Abd El Majid, and covers events taking place in 1999. The translation is provided by Robison's associate, known here as “Sammi.”
The first two translations from this notebook detailed an agreement between members of the Saddam regime and the Taliban to establish diplomatic and intelligence based cooperation. This final translation further advances the link between the Saddam regime and world-wide Islamic Jihad terrorism.
The relationship between the Taliban and Saddam appears to have been mediated by a Pakistani named Maulana Fazlur Rahman. Another document captured in Afghanistan and written by an Al Qaeda operative confirms the relationship between the Maulana and Saddam. The translation provided here includes an early 1999 meeting between the director of the IIS and the Maulana.
Another notebook entry records a meeting with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghani Islamic Jihadist and leader of the Islamic Party in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar made news recently with the BBC article Afghan Rebel’s pledge to al-Qaeda that reports on a video statement from Hekmatyar in which he states he will fight alongside A Qaeda. In this translation, Hekmatyar makes specific requests for a “center” in Baghdad and/or Tajikistan.
A third meeting involves an Islamist representing Bangladesh that we believe to be Fazlur Rahman Khalil. Another page of the notebook indicates Khalil is coming or came to Iraq. Khalil is a Taliban/Al Qaeda associate who signed the 1998 fatwa from Usama bin Laden declaring war on the United States.
Editor's notes: "Sammi" puts translation clarifications in parenthesis. Robison (RR) uses parenthesis for clarification and bold-face type for emphasis.
Translation:
Translation for ISGP-2003-0001412 follows (PDF):
Page 70, Left Side:
Saturday 3/20 at 11:45
Met with him Mr. MS4 (translator’s note: MS4 is the code name for the high ranking IIS official).
1. Intelligence and security cooperation.
2. Mr. MS4 informed him that the Iraqi president and Iraqi leadership are interested in him.
3. “We are ready to help you in any country and against your enemies”. (translator’s note: most probably this is MS4)
4. Fadlul Haq - The governor of Peshawar that was assassinated.
(translator’s note: points 5 and 6 are direct quotes from the Afghani)
5. “We are facing a vicious international plot against the Islamic Party and cannot find any country to help us at the time being”.
6. “Iran helped us at the beginning and we brought 2,000 fighters but things changed at the time being. Also the Russians called to help but we do not trust them. Moscow and Iran want the war to drag on.” (RR: this is probably the Taliban vs. Northern Alliance conflict). This is why he is coming to Baghdad for help. Asked Baghdad to help open a center in Tajikistan or in Baghdad and they will bring them (translator’s note: not clear what them refers to) in through Iran or Northern Iraq.
He asked for help in printing Afghani money in Baghdad or help in printing it in Moscow.
Page 69, Right Side:
Stinger missiles have a range of 5 kilometers. (translator’s note: there is only this one sentence on this page)
Page 69, Left Side:
Meeting of MS4 with 6951 on 4/10 at 8 p.m. in room 710.
He (6951) inquired about our relation with Usama (bin Laden).
(translator’s note: The Iraqi answer is not reported.).
He (6951) proposed to the Taliban to form a front with Iraq, Libya and Sudan.
He met some of them in Hajj (Translator’s note: Pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, it is one of the five pillars of Islam) and he came to the conclusion that they do not know anything about Foreign Relations.
The Taliban defense minister is Abdul Razzak (unclear) Association of Muslim Clerics.
They openly claim that they are against America.
He said that he was ready to build relations between the Taliban and Iraq.
(translator’s note: meeting continues on both sides of page 68/76, with questions about Pakistani politics and the other Islamic parties.) The Iraqi official says, “I suggest that the parties come closer together because that means power to Islam against the American and Zionist policies”.
Page 39, Left Side:
Meeting with an Islamist leader from Bangladesh. He promises support to Iraq. He says: “Let them know that I made Bangladesh a second country to Mr. President and we have 125 million (people).” (RR: Although no name is given for this meeting, it is important to note Fazlur Rahman Khalil, noted for meeting with Iraqi officials in the previous article, signed the 1998 fatwa as “Fazlur Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh”. This is a strong indication that this meeting is with Khalil or his representative.)
Page 27, Left side:
(translator’s note: contains notes with information on prior meetings recorded in the notebook.)
The mentioned person (Translator’s note: Fazlur Rahman) arrived to the country on 11/27/1999 and he was hosted in Al Rachid Hotel suite number 526. He will leave on 12/1/1999.
(translator’s comment: note No. 1 in a list of notes.)
He visited Iraq on the beginning of April 1999 and the ex-director of the intelligence, may God rest his soul, instructed him to mediate between the Taliban and the leader of the Afghani Islamic party, Hekmatyar following the request for mediation done by Hekmatyar to the leadership of Iraq during a visit when they met us on 3/19/1999.
End Translation
Analysis:
Because Arabic writing is right to left, the pages in this notebook go in reverse chronological order. The note on page 27 indicates that Hekmatyar met with the IIS on March 19, 1999. The translation of page 70 is dated March 20 and it refers to someone from the Islamic Party, which is Hekmatyar’s group. Therefore it makes sense that the meeting on page 70 is with Hekmatyar.
The note on page 27 also says the meeting was with the director if the IIS, so we believe MS4 is his code-name. It appears that Hekmatyar, a jihadist leader warring with the Taliban for control of Afghanistan at the time, asked Baghdad “to help open a center in Tajikistan or in Baghdad and they will bring them (translator’s note: not clear what them refers to) in through Iran or Northern Iraq.” There is a strong indication that this requested “center” is a jihadist training camp.
From a US Department of State report Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996:
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar … maintained training and indoctrination facilities in Afghanistan, mainly for non-Afghans. They continue to provide logistic support and training facilities to Islamic extremists despite military losses in the past year. Individuals who trained in these camps were involved in insurgencies in … Tajikistan…
It looks very much like Hekmatyar, a long-time jihad leader and recently self-identified Al Qaeda associate, is asking the Saddam regime for a jihad training camp in Tajikistan and/or Baghdad.
Page 27 tells us that the Maulana Fazlur Rahman was meeting with the IIS Director in early April. The meeting on page 69 fits the time frame, has the code for the IIS director, and the guest speaks for the Taliban indicating that “6951” is the Maulana. According to these notes, the Maulana “proposed to the Taliban to form a front with Iraq, Libya and Sudan.” He also enquires about the IIS relationship to Usama bin Laden.
In researching the Maulana, a third document has been found that demonstrated the relationship between Saddam and the Maulana. The document which appears to be an IIS memo also mentions a relationship with Hekmatyar. There is no government authentication of the document. Because this document matches closely with what we find in the IIS agent notebook we will reference it so that the reader may decide.
The article entitled Exclusive: Saddam Possessed WMD’s, Had Extensive Terror Ties states:
A senior government official who is not a political appointee provided CNSNews.com with copies of the 42 pages of Iraqi Intelligence Service documents. The originals, some of which were hand-written and others typed, are in Arabic. CNSNews.com had the papers translated into English by two individuals separately and independent of each other.
The CNS report includes a translation of a memo from the IIS to Saddam. The memo is dated January 25, 1993. The subject is IIS influence with two groups: the JUI, led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman; and, the Afghani Islamic Party led by Hekmatyar. These are the same two men meeting with the IIS in Baghdad in 1999, according to the notebook.
The document states that the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) depended upon Pakistani support as well as foreign help from Iraq and Libya. It also mentions that the secretary general of the JUI has had a good relationship with the IIS since 1981, and that he is “ready for any mission”.
The IIS document reported on by CNS News also states that the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar relies on Iraqi funding. It says the relationship has existed since 1989 and has improved under Hekmatyar’s leadership. Although this document has not yet been validated by the U.S, government, we can see very specific information, not publicly available before 2004, that matches what we find in the IIS notebook. It indicates a long history of Saddam regime support to Islamic jihad groups, and that the IIS considers them organizations that will take on missions for Iraq’s interests.
Epilogue:
Let’s review what we have learned from the IIS notebook.
• We learned that in 1999 the IIS met with three significant leaders of Islamic jhad from Afghanistan: a warlord and Islamic jihadist; an Al Qaeda leader; and, a man known as the “Father of the Taliban.”
• The Saddam regime and Taliban leadership agreed to diplomatic ties and a secret intelligence service relationship. They discussed security cooperation with Hekmatyar’s Islamic Jihad group. The Taliban representative also agreed to support the Saddam regime in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, a region sympathetic to and actively involved with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the world-wide Islamic jihad movement. An Islamist, most likely the Al Qaeda and Taliban affiliated Fazlur Rahman Khalil, promised the support of Bangladesh.
• We see a request to the Saddam regime for a training center in Baghdad or Tajikistan from a jihad leader accused by the U.S. State Department during the Clinton Administration of running Islamic extremist training camps.
• There is a discussion about transporting something into these centers, including a discussion that appears to mention surface-to-air missiles.
• And, we have numerous statements of Islamic fidelity between Afghani jihad leaders and the Saddam regime, with many statements of mutual animosity towards the United States and intent to cooperate.
This notebook thus provides significant evidence that the Saddam regime collaborated with and supported Islamic jihad elements in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban and Al Qaeda were attacking United States citizens and their interests and plotting the 9/11 attacks.
In this notebook, we see a Saddam Hussein actively seeking to expand his sphere of influence in a region at the heart of the world-wide Islamic jihad movement.
This now-public relationship between Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Saddam Hussein deserves great scrutiny.
As we researched the Maulana, a picture came into focus that our team was not looking to find: The Maulana is a senior leader of an affiliation of Pakistani groups supportive of Islamic jihad. These groups include the JUI and the Jamaat Islami (JI). The JUI provided direct support to both the planner and paymaster of the 9/11 attacks. The Pakistani government accused the JI of working with Al Qaeda. The Maulana mediated an intelligence pact between the IIS and the Taliban.
Clearly, this evidence indicates that the Maulana was in a position to procure assistance from Iraq for the 9/11 attacks.
Dr. Laurie Mylroie, an expert on Iraq, testified in front of the 9/11 commission in 2003:
After al Qaeda moved to Afghanistan, Iraqi intelligence became deeply involved with it, probably, with the full agreement of Usama bin Ladin. Al Qaeda provided the ideology, foot soldiers, and a cover for the terrorist attacks; Iraqi intelligence provided the direction, training, and expertise…
This notebook demonstrates that Islamic jihad leaders in Afghanistan were seeking IIS assistance and Saddam was giving them that assistance.
If you need more, let me know.
I'm here to serve.
Thee Eman
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